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Demographic trends in family formation and family structure appear
to be converging across Western Europe in the last few decades. There
are fewer marriages, more lone mothers, rising divorce rates, declin-
.. ingand delayed fertility, and increases inwomen's employment. These
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trends have generated political and academic debates about
pronatalism, government support for particular family forms, and
the most "appropriate" mechanisms for the reconciliation of work
and family responsibilities. Some people may argtle that similar de;,.
mographic situations require similar policy responses, leading to a
standardization of benefits and programs across Europe. National
strategies, however, are rooted in different economic circumstances
(e.g.,budget concerns and relative prosperity), political processes (e.g.,
the role of parties and government), and cultural traditions (e.g., gen-
der ideology), and consequently, family policies reflect the different
ways that governments and populations conceptualize the family and
its relationship to the state (see Hantrais and Letablier 1996).
Many prior studies have analyzed various European family policies
and their associated consequences (e.g., Castles 1993; Hantrais and
Letablier 1996; Kamerman 1991;Lewis 1993;Millar and Warman
1996). Scholars have also scrutinized national debates on family is-
sues within political arenas (e.g., Macura, Eggers, and Frejka 1995).
There is also an expanding literature on popular attitudes toward the
welfare state, welfare services provided by the state, and the extent
of state responsibility for public well-being (see Bonoli, George, and'
Taylor-Gooby 2000). Public opinion research helps lIS understand
the degree to which state ideology and policy is internalized and ac-
cepted by the citizenry (Treas and Widmer 2000). Few researchers,
however, have examined public opinion on the content of family
policies. Yet like other scholars (Bonoli, George, and T aylor-Gooby
2000;Macura, Eggers, and Frejka 1995; Moors and Palomba 1995),
we contend that popular sentiment constitutes an important link be-
tween individuals and policy outcomes, because politicians and other'
policymakers depend on the support of, and must respond to, their
constituencies as they attempt to create and implement specific fam-
ily policy choices. Thus, we explore the fit between national contexts
and public opinion about the policies that should be the focus of
government action.
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The primary aim of this paper, then, is to identify the degree to which
individual attitudes about family policy priorities vary across the na-
tional populations of the European Union (ED). Because European
welfare regimes historically differ in their treatment of women as
workers and/or mothers (see Misra 1998; Ostner and Lewis 1995),
we also examine whether gender differences in policy preferences
exist within each country. To investigatepublic sentiment about family
policy priorit.ies, we use da~a from t?e 1993 E~robarometer surv:y
(Reifand Mehch 1993), which contained a topical module on family
life.We limit our analysis to the twelve countries that were members
of the European Union at the time of the survey: Belgium, Den-
mark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
DernographicContexts
Although most Western European countries experienced similar de-
mographic trends in recent decades, they occurred at a different pace
and!or magnitude. First, Europeans are having fewer children today
than they did 20years ago. In fact, with the exception of Ireland,
total fertility rates are below replacement (Table 1). The combined
total fertility rate for the European Union fell from 2.61 children per
woman in 1960to 1.44children per woman in 1993 (Eurostat 1995).
This downward trend in fertility has been most dramatic in countries
with historically higher fertility rates, such as Spain, Italy, Portugal,
Greece, and Ireland.
Second, marriage rates are also declining throughout Europe: while
the number of marriages has dropped, divorce rates and the average
ageat first marriage have risen substantially (Eurostat 1995). Never-
theless, while Europeans are still forming families, they are not
necessarily "traditional" ones, that is, legally marriedcouples with
child(ren): six out of ten Europeans live as part of a couple (married
or not), and 20% of births occur outside of marriage (European
Commission 1994; Eurostat 1995). These family structures vary sig-
nificantly across the European Union, with a notable North-South
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divide (see Table 1):single-parent families and cohabiting couples
with children (outside of marriage) are much more common inNorth-
ern than in Southern Europe (European Commission 1994;Eurostat
1995).
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European families receive different types and levels of support from
their national governments because national policies and programs
diverge in rationales, objectives, and comprehensiveness (European
Commission 1994; Hantrais and Letablier 1996). Some countries
have an explicit, integrated approach to family policy (e.g.,Denmark,
France, Luxembourg, and Ponugal) , while the policies of other coun-
FamilyPolicy Contexts
Despite these trends, Europeans greatly value family life and having
children, albeit in fewer numbers now than in earlier decades (see
Jones and Brayfield 1997; Brayfield, Jones and Adler 2001). In fact,
960/0 of Europeans consider the family to be the most important
aspect of life (European Commission 1994). At the same time, the
ability to form a viable family (of any size) is constrained by eco-
. nomic considerations, and these considerations vary across individuals,
social classes, and countries.
Third, the general rise in women's employment has irrevocably al-
tered the fabric of family life. Many women are delaying, or even
Joregoing, childbearing becauseof itspotential negativeeffectson
. earnings, seniority, and career trajectories (seeAdler 1997). This is
one reason (among others) for the declining birth rates. At the same
time, with increasing numbers of mothers employed outside the home,
the demand for substitute child care and other domestic services has
increased exponentially. Although all European countries have ex-
perienced thesefundamental changes, the rate ofwomen's economic
activity, especially that of mothers with young children, varies con-
.siderably among member states: mothers in Denmark, Portugal,
Belgium, and France have higher labor force participation rates than
mothers in other European countries.
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tries lack cohere,nce (e,g,~ Italy, Greece, Spain, and the United King-
dom). The particular mixture and intensity of policies, in terms of
en~itlement, fi~ancial commitment,andmechanisms for delivery, differ
quite substantially among the member states, depending on the na-
tional ideologiesabout the "welfare state" and its role in family affairs.
Thus, the extent to which Europeans consider family welfare to bea
pri:ate m~tter (asin the United Kingdom) or a public responsibility
(asm.Belgmffi',Denmark, and France) also varies cross-nationally.
Despite thesedivergences, Western Europe haswitnesseda growing
acceptance of, and in some countries an outright demand for, state
intervention on behalf of families (see Millar and Warman 1996).
As a result, allED member states have enacted policies intended to
improve the well-being of families.
Family policy potentially covers a wide range of legislation, programs
and?rovis~o~. Policies, however,may not berecognized explicitly~
family policiesperseeither by national governments or the general
public.~bviously, governmentscan directly encouragechildbearing
by reducing the costs associated with raising children. Measures such
as child allowances, birth grants, and maternity leave are identified
explicitly asconstituting family policy. National governments differ
in the extent to which they fund these family benefits (Table 1). For
example, the relative size of government expenditures on family ben-
efits is much greater in Ireland and Denmark than in the Southern
Europea~countries. Other policies can promote family well-being,
but less directly, through family-related tax provisions, subsidized
~ousing, the creation of part-time jobs, and the availability of flex- .
ible work hours. Thus, Europeans have responded to work-family
dilemmas in different ways, based on the particular economic, politi-
cal, and cultural circumstances prevalent in their countries. For
example, part-time employment for women is a more feasibleoption
for combining work and family in the Netherlands than in Greece;
with 63.8% of employed Dutch women and only 8.4% ofemployed
Greek women working part time (Table 1). Regardless of their in-
tentions, all of these policies will come under closer scrutiny as -.
member states attempt to trim their social safety nets to reduce siz- .
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ablegovernment deficits. Consequently, the issue of policy conver-
gence or "harmonization" has become a hot topic for researchers
and policymakers alike.
Researchers have used a variety of empirical indicators and concep-
tual dimensions to classify European countries into typologies or
clusters(e.g., Esping-Andersen 1990; Gornick, Meyers, and Ross 1997;
Lewis 1992; O'Connor 1993; Orloff 1993; Korpi 1989,2000;Ostner
and Lewis 1995). Feminist scholarship, in particular, documents the
importance of gender ideology in studying welfare state regimes.
Osmer and Lewis (1995: 185),for example, argue that:
As matters stand, assumptions about the existence of a male
breadwinner and a dependent family consisting of a female and
child are built into welfare provision to varying degrees in ED
member states. Although the vast majority of countries recog-
nize the male-breadwinner role, they differ significantly in the
extent to which women are confined to homemaking and moth-
erhood and are recognized also asworkers.
Basedon this logic, Ostner and Lewis (1995) classify several Euro-
pean countries according to the strength of the male-breadwinner
norm as manifested in national tax and social security systems, the
level of provisions for public childcare, and the nature of women's
'labor force participation. They contend that Britain, Germany, and
Ireland are strong male-breadwinner countries because their social
entitlement programs treat women almost exclusively as dependent
. wives. They classify France and Belgium as moderate male-bread-
winner countries because social programs in these countries
conceptualizewomen aswives, mothers, and workers simultaneously,
and they characterize Denmark as a weak male-breadwinner country
becauseDanish social policy defines women primarily asworkers.
. Papadopoulos (1998) argues that the countries that constitute "the
periphery of the ED" (i.e.,Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Italy)
are characterized by a centrality of the family as a social institution
and as the key provider of welfare. According to Saunders (1991),
95
~i'<:'_ '...:-':l. _( ..
I' Socia/Thought &Research
the Italian concept of mothering involves the strong expectation for
women to serve their children indefinitely. These countries also have
strong orthodox religious traditions and very traditional patriarchal
family structures. Consequently they have, to varying degrees and
based on variollSindicators, very rudimentary family policies. Over-
all, Papadopoulos (1998) concludes that the peripheral countries have
the least generous child support packages, and thus, public dissatis-
faction with family policy in these countries is, not surprising.
In a historical comparative analysis of the relationship between de-
mographic changes and family policy in twenty-two countries
Gauthie.r (1996) proposes four main models of family policy: (1)
pro-family/pro-natalist, (2) pro-traditional; (3) pro-egalitarian; and
~4) pro-family but non-interventionist. She claims that family policy
illFrance (an~ 9uebec) fits ~pro-family/pro-natalistmodelinwhichsup-
port for families, and childbearing in particular, is viewed as the
responsibility of government. Under this model, measures that re-
duceobstacles to f~nility,includingsuppon formaternal employment,
are central to family policy. Gauthier (1996) places Germany in the
category of the pro-traditional model, whereby preservation of the tra-
ditional.~ale-breadwinner familydictates the nature ofstatesupport
for families. Gauthier (1996) identifies Denmark (and Sweden) as
exemplars of the pro-egalitarian model becauseof their unfaltering state
support for gender equality, creating the conditions that foster the
combination of family responsibilities and employment for both
wom~n.and men. She characterizes Britain (and the United States)as
subscribingto thepro-family butnon-interventionistmodelinwhich alow
level of government support for families is available, and then only
to poor families. It is important to note that Gauthier (1996) ac-
knowledges that Southern European countries do not fit well into
~ny of he~ four models. Despite this limitation, her analysis high-
llg~ts the Importance of understanding the linkage between family.
policy and the complex constellation of socioecono.mic and demo-
graphic circumstances aswell as the historical, political, and cultural
traditions of national populations.
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More recently, Korpi (2000) also promotes the importance of gen-
derand family policies in his typology of welfare states. He first
developsthree ideal typical models basedon general family support,
'dual-earner support, and market-oriented gender policies. He places
countries into one of these three models by using several empirical
indicators, and then he refines the classification scheme by combin-
ing these 'gendered institutional models with four models of social
insurance (i.e., basic security, targeted, encompassing, and state cor-
'poratist models). With respect to the countries in our study, Korpi's
integrated scheme shows that the UK is a basic security/market ori-
entedcountrywith high classinequality and medium genderinequality,
Denmark belongs to the basic security/dual earner group with me-
dium class inequality and low gender inequality, Ireland and the
Netherlands are in the basicsecurity/general family support category,
.andBelgium, Germany, Italy, and France are in the state corporatist/
generalfamily support category.
DoesPublic OpinionReflectNational Context?
Macroscopic typologies alone tell us little about how European citi-
zensthemselves view the importance of family-related policies or to
what extent they agree on government priorities for intervention.
Undoubtedly, public opinion should reflect differences in national
, context. We contend that national governments influence public
opinion via public discourse about family policies in terms of how
these issues are framed in the first place. For example, government
officials aswell as the media play important roles in persuading people
to support some programs orpolicies, but not others. In otherwords,
state propaganda about family issues may be internalized by indi-
viduals, and then manifested in public opinion. At the same time, the
institutionalcharacter of different welfarestate regimesand the varying
economicsituations of familiesin different national contexts are likely
to affectpublic support for various family policies across countries.
Moreover, some countries share a common language, religious lega-
cies, economic situations, and family policy orientations across their
national borders, and thus, we would expect public opinion to cluster
97
...... ~
;~.>, ..
Social Thought &Research
into "attitude regimes" in a pattern similar to policy regimes or other
types of structural regimes. Therefore, we hypothesize that the cross-
national pattern of public opinion about government priorities for
family policy should approximate the clustering of countries with
somewhat similar demographic, economic, and policy contexts.
The twelve countries in our analysis appear to fall into three clusters, .
based on the literature about social welfare provisions in conjunction
with the indicators in Table 1. The first cluster - Spain, Greece,
Italy, Ireland, and Portugal- is characterized by lesseconomic pros-
perity (asevidenced by lower GDP per capita and other measures of
economic development), lower divorce rates, lower births outside of
marriage, lower proportion of women in the labor force (except Por-
tugal), lower expenditures for family benefits, and later year of
women's enfranchisement. These countries also subscribe to a well-
entrenched patriarchal family ideology and hierarchical religious
traditions (Catholicism and Greek Orthodoxy). Based on low eco-
nomic development, traditional gender and family patterns, and
religious orthodoxy, we refer to this group of countries as the tradi-
tionalcluster. Another cluster - Denmark, Belgium, and France - is
characterized by greater state provisions for family well-being, higher
births outside of marriage (except Belgium), higher rates of mater-
nal employment, and according to Ostner and Lewis (1995) a
moderate-to-weak tradition of the male-breadwinner norm in their
social policies. We refer to this group of countries as the generous
cluster. The other countries - Germany, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, and the United Kingdom - fall in between the other two
empirical clusters, and although Ostner and Lewis (1995) claim that
the articulation of the male-breadwinner norm isstrong in Germany
and the United Kingdom, it is certainly not as strong in these four'
countries as it is in the traditional cluster. We call this grouping of
countriesthe mixed-moderatecluster.
In short, we hypothesize that national populations who share similar
structural and ideological contexts will voice similar preferences for
potential targets of government action to improve family life. Resi-
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dentsof countries with generous family policies should be more simi-
1 r to each other in their policy preferences than they are to residents
ofcountries in the traditional cluster with lower levels of economic
prosperity an~ less integrated family po~icies '" to reside~tsof co~n­
tries in the mixed-moderate cluster with a mixture of ideological
standpoints and policy orientations. Likewise, the attitudes of resi-
dents in Spain, Greece, Italy, Ireland, and Portugal should cluster
together on issues that they id~ntifyas m?st in nee~ of gove:~ment
intervention on behalf of family well-being, especially policies de-
signed to improve the .basic standard of living. While Germany,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom clearly do
not fit into the other two clusters, the structural and ideological con-
. texts of these countries are more disparate than in the traditional or
generous clusters. Hence, we would not be surprised if the policy
preferences of the residents of these four countries do not neatly
cluster into a similar "attitude regime."
We also examine whether gender plays a significant role in determin-
ingindividual attitudes toward family policy priorities; namely we ask
the question, do the policy concerns of women differ from those of
men? Gender can affect the relationship between national character-
isticsand individual policy preferences in a number of ways. Many
family policies, although gender-neutral in language (e.g., the avail-
ability of affordable, quality child care services), implicitly concern
the promotion of equal opportunity for women and men, purpo-
sivelyhelping women to more successfully balance employment and
parenting roles. In general, we hypothesize that if women are the
direct beneficiaries of particular family policies, they will voice stron-
ger support for these policy priorities. In contrast, men may be less
concerned about policiespromoting women's employment and more
concerned about policies that enhance the overall economic position
of families more generally, such aspolicies compatible with the tradi-
tional male-breadwinner/female-homemaker model. In countries
where benefits are tied to labor force participation and where a large
proportion of women are in the labor force, women may be more
concerned about family leave benefits and child care. In countries
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First, we calculated the percentage of respondents in each coun-
try who selected each particular policy priority, irrespective of
how many issues each respondent mentioned. We used Scheffe's
multiple comparison tests to detect significant differences in the
national percentages for each policy issue.
101
The Eurobarometer survey asked respondents "If the purpose is to
improve life for families, which three of.th~ followin.g th~?gs should
the (national) Government make top pnonty for action?
1. Availability of suitable housing
2. Improving economic prospects
3. Cost of educating children
4. Flexible working hours
5. Availability of child care arrangements
6. Tax advantages for families with children
7. Level of child allowance
8. Length of post-natal parental leave
9. Availability of contraception
These policy issues represent two basic thematic concerns: (1) a
family's economic well-being, and (2)maternal employment. Items
1, 2, 3, 6, and 7 focus on various dimensions of the standard of
living, and Ite1I1:s 4, 5, 8, and 9 focus mainly on women's concerns.
Theoretically, each respondent should have selected three policy pri-
orities. However, some respondents selected fewer than three items
(22.9%, n=3,003) or more than three items (.2%, n=32). Neverthe-
'less, the vast majority of respondents chose exactly three items other
than "don't know" (76.8%, n= 10,074). One limitation of these de-
pendent variables is that they mainly tap respondents' assessment of
'what should be made a top priority, implying that it may not be a prior-
ity yet. That means that respondents who are satisfied with the
. current prioritization of a policy may not list it as one that should
be made a priority even if they believe it is very important.
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where the pa~riarchalfamily rather than th~ state is.viewe~ asthe key']:"':>:: Measurement of Family Policy Preferences
welfare provider, the lack of comprehensive family policy may be': ...r .;.
regarded as an important issue in "modernization." Moreover, the'r;I~" '/,.~::
absence of family policy, by default, reinforces the role of women as "':,' -.",.:;;'"
caregivers of children and legitimizes their dependency on men..,~,'/".':
MetIxxlology
Data Source
We use data from the 39th wave of the Eurobarometer survey (Reif·.ft' ·
and Melich 1993). In addition to standard core questions, each wave···:/L}:::~:/
targets selected issues of concern to the Commission of the Euro-?~?l~',~"
pean Communities. The focus of this particular survey was public ·f'I····..·.··•·
awareness of and attitudes toward the activities, institutions, and<:·:,·.~:.~,·
policies of the European Union as well as a special set of questions t ;.. f'
about family values. INRA (EUROPE), a European Network of '. '<~.:'.
Market and Public Opinion Research agencies, conducted the sur- -::;:~;":,,
veys between March 16 and April 16, 1993. The sample represents: t\;;:;i~:~:t;~;ho:;::;;~~~~~a~~~~~~e:~a:::~~~~::~:~~~;~ ;-:~~fi.
way also participated in this survey, but unfortunately Finnish .:)~Ai)
r.espondent~were not asked any of the questions concerning family .: ~~.i:
life, Also, SInceNorway has withdrawn its application to the Euro-
pean Union and because our analytic objective is to examine
attitudes within the European Union, we exclude Norwegian
respondents. In each country, the basic sample design relied on
~2~!::!~'{~:;~~;!~~;:~:~~~;~;~~~i:!~~;;~a~;;3::cf!':' .
respondents because previous research demonstrates that regional .. <• · Analytic Strategy
gaps in Ger~an ~ttitu~es towar~ several.work-family .is.sues re- .:sf .
flect pre-unification differences in state ideology, policies, and £),}.
work-family demographics (Adler & Brayfield 1996; Adler & >'tJ
Brayfield 1997) . ;·'::1·~·.,::~!
·.;·11'
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In general, the residents of the traditional cluster and the mixed-
, moderate cluster were more likely than residents of the generous
clusterto choose policy priorities that concerned a family's economic
. well-being. First, respondents mentionedavailability ofsuitablehousing
most often in Spain, the United Kingdom, and East & West Ger-
many (over 59%),while it was mentioned least often in Belgium
(22%). Second, East Germans (68%) and the French (57%) a~e
most likely to mention improving economic prospects. For this
policy priority, there are no significant differences among the
Table 2 presents the national percentages of respondents w~o se-
lectedeach particular policy issue, irrespective of how many Issues
eachrespondent mentioned. There iswide variation in public opin-
. ion acrossEU member states, and many of the national differences
arestatistically significant (detailsof the Scheffe'stests are not shown
inTable 2). To he!p readers identify the general clustering of coun-
tries for each policy priority, Table 3 provides a summary of the
countries that form a statistically significant cluster in mentioning a
particularpolicy priority most often (i.e., the top cluster, which varies
from only one country to as many as five countries, depending on
the results of the Scheffe's tests).
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N~xt, we investigated whether the observe~pattern~ in nationar:t;~t'~'LasdY,we examined gender ?ifferences in policy preferences. We
amtud:s are merely the result.of comp?sltlOnal dI~fe~ences in:>11:;i,.J: calculatedthe net.eff:ct of beI~g female (~ =~emale, 0=male) on thet~e natIon~1 samples. ~0 do this, we e~tImated a logistic ~egres- ··.·•• ':f[i~.l".:. logodds of menuonmg a paru.cl~lar policy Item for ea~h country,
sion equauon for each Item by regressmg country of residence-' ~J;t·, controlling for other charactenstIcs of the respondent, i.e., age, em-
on whether or not respondents mentioned a particular item co oJ} '~ii:.;:i I -rnentstatus, family income, presence of children by age group;
trolling for individual demographics (age, gender):':'~'!:~:;..~~~italstatus, attitude toward maternal employment, and attitudeempl~yment-r~latedcharacteristics (emp~oyment sta.tus, incom~;:;:!.Y'1':' towardEur?pean unific~tion.We estimated these equations fo~each
quartiles), fa~II'y.status ~resence o! children, marital/panner;2!;:fj.'i: country usmg each policy targ~t as a sep~rate dependent vanable,
status), and mdIvI~ual attitudes (attitude toward maternal em-',;f¥'::;;:;: .. resulting in a total of 130 equations. In this paper, we pre~ent o~lyploym~nt, ~nd at~ltu~e t~ward European unificati.on).. peoPle,·.;~";:,>'.••.;,.'·.•." ,~.,:",,I.:,,' ..'~;,,~.',:',.'"'" •••.':.:,,~,,,,' th,e logistic regression coe~ficients for the net gend<:r gap I~ policy
",:,ho differ in t~eir life Circumstances may also dIffer III their "}l'~{ . referencesto focus attennon on the role of gender m shapmg pub-VI~WS about policy prioritie~. For e~ample, parents may have a'.?:i.'::~·~ tc opinion about family policies.
~f~~~t:~e~h::a~:71~sIf:e~h~tt~a~~:~;u;~ifl~:~~e, ~~~:i~~~::·,'.·":;.-·.~,:;.;,,'·,:-,',,.,":1:0:.:.,·t.,:f,',:,'.• ··, " Resultsi~div:idual's ~deas about women's and men's family responsibili- >;:. ".~"
nes (I.e., their gender-role ideology) and their feelings about the~\I·:f~\'··t,
soci~l and economic integration of Europe also may be relevant';;;.t';
to hIS or her policy preferences. ~~j]}l,',,·,:-~-':
We.entere~ each countrr: into the equation as a separate du~my'ffl}'
variable, WIth the exception of the Netherlands, which serves as<::~(I~:E
the reference country. We chose the Netherlands as the omitted:.~·~;F:c,
reference .country because it generally falls in the middle of our;:;~J
hy~othesized clusters ~f count~ies. In this pa~er, ,:e.report thed:!~
main net effects of national residence on public opInIon; we do :~~~:(I>
not provide details on the net effects of each control variable':\ff
(coefficients for the control variables are available from the au~ g~ij
thors). This strategy allows us to concentrate on national ..~,'XLI:;-
diff~rences, net of ~ompositional variation among respondentsi~:
of different countries. ~~?,~~
To get a more comprehensive picture of the constellation of na-;,,,;n
tional sentiments towar.d d~sirable pol.icy ta:ge~s? we comparedi.~1
the most popular combinations of policy prIorItIes within each ,,:3.f
country for respondents who chose exactly three items other ')}~~i
than '~do~'t know." In this paper, we present the most popular ':;rl
combinations out of the 84 possible combinations.~l;l·
'11
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Policy Priority Top Cluster
Housing Spain
United Kingdom
East Germany
West Germany
Economic Prospects East Germany
France
Educational Cost Portugal
Spain
Ireland
Tax Advantages West Germany
Ireland
Luxembourg
Greece
Denmark
Child Allowance Greece
Spain
Ireland
Flexible Hours Denmark
France
Netherlands
Childcare Availability East Germany
Parental Leave Denmark
Contraception Ireland
United Kingdom
East Germany
Table 3
Countries in which Each Policy Priority Is Mentioned Most Often
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national percentages for Denmark, UK, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Portugal, West Germany, and the Netherlands (29-36%). Third,
the cost ofeducating children is of greatest concern in Portugal,
Spain, and Ireland (over 45% in these countries), and of least con-
cern in Denmark and Luxembourg (15% and 220/0, respectively).
Fourth, public opinion about taxadvantagesforfamilies with chilo
dren appears split among three groups: Spain, Portugal, the
Netherlands, East Germany, France, and United Kingdom are
least concerned (16-24%), and West Germany, Ireland, Luxem-
Note:We identifiedthe top cluster of countries by conductingScheffe's tests of significance.
TheScheffeprocedure is the most conservativemultiple-comparison testbecause it requires
largerdifferencesbetween pairs of means to achievestatisticalsignificance. Countriesthat fall
into the top cluster are not significantlydifferent in the nationalpercentagesof respondentswho
mentioned the policy priority in question.
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bourg, Greece, and Denmark are most concerned (31-350/0), with
Belgium and Italy in between. Fifth, Greek respondents (37%)
are much more likely to choose levelofchildallowance as a gov-
ernment priority, while Danish and Dutch respondents are least
likely (6% and 11%, respectively), with East & West Germans
and respondents from Luxembourg also voicing lower levels of
concern for this issue.
SocialThought &Research
The general pattern of national sentiment about policies that pro-
mote maternal employment does not neatly coincide with our
hypothesized clusters of countries. First,jlexible workinghours ismen-
tioned most often in Denmark, France, and the Netherlands (over
44%), while there are no significant differences between the eight
lowest national percentages (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, East &
West Germany, United Kingdom, and Luxembourg: 20-31%). Sec-
ond, East Germans are most likely (48%), while the Spanish (120/0)
and French (20%) are the least likely, to choose theavailability a/child
carearrangements asa government priority. Although there appearsto
be a gap between Spanish and French respondents, this difference is
not statisticallysignificant. Third, length a/post-natalparental leave is
mentioned most often by Danish respondents (45%) and least often
by respondents in East & West Germany, Luxembourg, Italy, Spain,
Ireland, and Greece (13-21%). Fourth, few respondents consider
availability a/contraception to be apriority inany country, but respon- .
dents in Ireland, United Kingdom, and East Germany voice
somewhat (significantly) higher levels of concern than respon-
dents in the other countries.
Are these observed patterns simply the result of compositional dif-
ferences in the national samples? The results in Table 4 demonstrate
that national differences in perceptions of policy priorities to im-
prove family life are not solely attributable to variations in the
demographic configurations of member states. Although composi-
tional differences do reduce the size and statistical significance of
some national gaps, the basic cross-national patterns of policy
priorities are similar to the unadjusted percentages.
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Recall that we hypothes!zed that coun~rieswoul~ cluster into three),? ~rf./
groups based on the vanous constellations of available suppon sys-:,:.~'y:.
terns and national demographic trends. For example, we expeCted":}"~":;'(:"'"
that while people from Germany, Luxembourg, and the United"::;"'
Kingdom would voice policy ~referencessimilar to those of people'S: '.
from the Netherlands (the mised-moderare cluster), people from ,.~:.,
Belgium, Denmark, and France (the generous cluster) would be less ..... ),:1',.;-
concerned about a panicularpolicy than Dutch people (the excluded<;.f~:
reference group in the logistic regression equations). We also ex.'?;"!:',"
pect~~ people from Spain, Greece, Italy, Ireland, and Ponugal (~he>!,.Jf.t_~t
traditional cluster) to be more concerned about that same pohey,,,(¥
than Dutch people. in}
The observed cross-national pattern, however, is not so clear; there ":'::}','
is much variation in the clustering of countries across the diverse >t
policy priorities. Compared to the Netherlands, housing isa higher !
-,.;':,::1...priority issue in Spain, the United Kingdom, and both East and
c
,!:
West Germany and to a lesserextent in Ireland, Denmark, and Lux- ',' : 1- -.
embourg. Yet it is of significantly less imponance to Belgians and ',. "r
the French. Economic prospects are of much greater concern in .,» ,.
~s~~~~~:~oa:a~:~:t~~~::~~~s~:;~~~~::~~;:::~~~ ~:1~:~!~:!!1
while Danes are much less concerned than the Dutch. Respon-<~:~('
::::~~:~~~;:f::~~n~~::~~~n~~:s~~~~~;i;~~a~~:::~lit
dents in the Netherlands. Spanish, Irish, andPonuguese respondents,:';~,
are much more worried about child allowances, while Danish re-
spondents are less worried than those in the Netherlands. While!.'!!.
respondents from most of the countries are lessworried about flex- ,a;iI
ible working hours than the Dutch, for Danish respondents flexible ,\n
working hours are a higher priority. Compared to the Dutch, East';:!
Germans voice more interest in child care policy, while spaniards"J'I'~
and the French voice lessinterest. Whereas East Germans and Greeks ;,~{: .
.~:.;:'",:,'1.- ~'.are lessconcerned about parental leave, Danes are more concerned ,'.~~, j
Compared to the Dutch, UK and Irish respondents are more likelY)H
to consider contraceptio.n .a priority, and Greeks and Danes are .·,.~•.'~,.;·.~~,;".~.·."I·'.'."less concerned about thisissue.)/'
",,-.:,;;"'108;'~il\
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These empirical clusters make sense given the different national con-
texts. People in countries with lower levelsof economic prosperity, for
.example, are most concerned about basic survival measures, like im-
proving their economic prospects. And people in countries in which
housing isproblematic, and in which there is no explicit link between
family policy and housing, are more likely to consider it a high priority.
Next, we compare the most popular combinations of policy tar-
getswithin each country for respondents who chose exactly three
itemSother than "don't know." Table 5 presents the top combi-
nation within each country. Because the most popular
combinations represent such low percentages of the national
samples, we also present the top three combinations in Table 6
to get a more comprehensive picture of the national sentiments
to\vard desirable targets.
Taken together, these tables show some support for our hypoth-
esized clusters, but it would be more appropriate to divide the
countries into four, not three, empirical clusters. Respondents from
the traditional countries - Spain, Greece, Italy, Ireland, and Portu-
. .gal- are most similar in their concerns about housing, economic
prospects, and educational costs. Respondents from Belgium and
France, two of the three countries in our hypothesized generous
duster, are similar in choosing economic prospects, educational costs,
and flexible working hours. But surprisingly, respondents from
. Denmark (hypothesized generous cluster) and the Netherlands (hy-
pothesized mixed-moderate cluster) - two countries that are quite
different in a number of ways - choose flexible working hours,
.. child care, and parental leave. Although the Dutch are most sup-
portive and Danes are least supportive of the supranational
involvement of the European Union in domestic family policy (54%
versus 19%), they choose the same combination of policy priorities.
The remaining respondents from the UK, Luxembourg, and Ger-
many (three of the four countries from our hypothesized
.: mixed-moderate cluster) choose housing, economic prospects, and
child care as top priorities.
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But there is another way to interpret why national populations
select particular issues as a high priority. Note that educational -
costs are a priority in the two empirical clusters that fall on the
opposite ends of the continuum. State financial assistance to par-
ents for their children's educational costs is most generous in
France and Belgium, and at the same time, it is least generous in
the Southern European countries and Ireland. Yet respondents
in both clusters prioritize educational costs. This outcome sug-
gests that people favorparticular policy priorities for two reasons.
First, people may voice a concern about a particular policy area
because that benefit, program, or policy is seriously lacking in
some way, falls short of their expectations, or may be cut in the
near future. Second, people may select a particular policy prior- .
ity because it is already a vital component of their national policy,
but they desire further expansion of its benefits.
Our secondary research question focuses on gender differences in
public opinion. Table 7 presents the net effect of gender on the log
odds of mentioning a panicular policy item for each country, con-
trolling for other characteristics of the respondent.
We highlight three general points about these results. First, we
find that gender influences attitudes toward a greater number of .
policy targets in the Netherlands than elsewhere. This finding
reinforces the Netherlands' "special status" in terms of various
other apparently contradictory dimensions, such as low female
labor force participation, relatively high social provisions, and a
strong Catholic tradition. Second, gender has no effect at all on
Greek, Italian, or Portuguese attitudes toward any policy target.
Note that all three of these countries fall into the traditional clus-
ter. Future research needs to uncover the reasons why gender
helps predict public opinion on family policy in some countries
but not in others. The answer may have something to do with
the severity of economic disadvantage in that the interests of
women and men may be more likely to converge in less prosper-
ous countries because of their focus on basic survival.
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Third, we find some, albeit limited, support for our contentio' ."
that women place a higher priority on policies that promot
n
women's employment and the reconciliation of work and fa ~
ily demands, while men prioritize policies that coincide mom
with t~eir traditional breadwinner responsibilities. Women a;:
more likely than men to mention flexible working hours as
. . . a
prIorIty in many countries (Denmark, West Germany, Spain
France, the.Netherlands, and the United Kingdom). Women ar;.
also more likely than men to mention childcare (in Belgium, the
Ne~herlands, and the United Kingdom) and parental leave (in
Spain, France, and the Netherlands). Flexible hours, childcare,
and parental leave are three obvious ways to support maternal em-
ployment. Men, however, are more likely than women to mention
housin~ (in Denmark and the Netherlands), economic prospects (in
the United Kingdom), tax relief (in East Germany and the Nether-
lands) - all issues directly related to the financial position of the
family and the traditional responsibility ofmen as breadwinners and
providers.
The effects of gender on attitudes toward educational costs of chil-
dren are perplexing. Women are less likely than men to mention
educational costs in Denmark and Ireland, but women are morelikely
than men to mention this issue in the Netherlands. Future research
should investigate the nature of these gender gaps: Why do women
an.d~en differ in their demands to target educational costs as a policy
priority?
Conclusion
Ouranalysisconfirms that the national patterns ofpublic opinion about
f~:r policy priorities roughly parallel the countries' subscription to
traditional gender ideology, level of economic prosperity, and the de-
gr~ and.~e of state suppon for families with children. Not only do
national mdicators reflect that Belgium, Denmark, and France are char-
acterized by relatively weak male-breadwinner norms, their residents
voice strong concern for protecting their extensive state support for
114
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.f roiliest The countries with the lowest levels of economic pros-
aerity - Southern Europe and Ireland - are also the ones with~ell-entrenchedgender ideologies and the least coherent family
olicies, and thus, it is reasonable that the residents of these coun-~ries are most concerned about basic survival measures, like the
availability of suitable housing and improving their economic
prospects. Th~ cou~tries between these two ~r~u~s ~x.hi~it
greater vari~ty In policy preferences ~eca~se of dissimilarities In
their historical. cultural, and economic CIrcumstances.
Skocpol and Amenta (1986) argue convincingly that the development
of socialpolicies is historically contingent upon various agents, such
as the Catholic Church, labor unions, the women's movement, and
left-wing parties (see also Misra 1998). For example, the Catholic
Church has supported family policy in France, Ireland, Italy, and
Denmark. The women's movement has fostered the expansion of
maternal leave and child care policies in France, Denmark, and the
United Kingdom. And labor unions have helped Italian women.
.Theseorganizations have been instrumental in developing policies
that purposively attempt to reduce gender inequalities in Scandinavia
or inmaintaining the male-breadwinner norm in Germany. Popular
sentiments could potentially become another such agent of social
change if mobilized in support of specific family policies. Our re-
search suggests the presence of "attitude regimes" that link national
characteristics and individual attitudes in particular patterns..
Our analysis also reveals a gender gap in family policy preferences.
In general, women are more likely to be concerned about work-
family reconciliation, whereas men's views align more with the
traditional male-breadwinner style of family support. This diver-
gence in public opinion confronts European policymakers who
advocate gender-sensitive policies that support allfamily forms, not
just traditional ones. Clearly, some families, especially poor fami-
lies and lone mothers, need both financial support and measures
that ease the combination of employment and parenthood. Given
the convergence of economic demands on families, both mothers
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comparative analysis islikelyto make a greater contribution to
~he understanding of national systems if it concentrates on try-
ing to unravel the cultural embeddedness of different family
forms and of the institutions involved in the policymaking pr~­
cess.
'lll~l}
Social7bottght &Research'·'Y ,~~~:;',: Patternsin FamilyPolicyPreferencesin theEuropean Union
.·:.r ·iif.:.~t:·;. -.'
and fathers are spending more time in employment, leaving li-:?'~~' f${»~rMarina A. and April Brayfield. 1996. "East-West Differences in
time to spend with their children and :ach ot~er. Parentallea~: ~1~,';', Attit~desAbout Employment and Family in Germany." The So-
f?r wo~en as.well as fo~ men may be Just as Important as finan- ciologtcal C?-uarterly 37(2):245-60. . ,,'
cial assistance in supporttng future generations of diverse f T Brayfield, April, Rachel Jones, and Manna Adler. 2001. Harrnoniz-
ami Ies. ing Work and Family in the European Union: Public Perceptions
Our research contribute~to tJ:e?terature on.comparative family policy "",c Ir~t:- ~~2Ci:il~;~:~,:~~~~~~l:n~~~o~::a~~;~o;e:;~:;;v;'P~d~::d
from the angle of,Pubhc OptnlOn. !h: mixed results regardingthe{:~;(:;{"' by' Tanja van der Lippe and Liset van Dijk. New York: Aldine de
co~:er~ence or divergenc~ofpubh~VI~':S about family policy pri-".'~?E , Gruyter.
orities I~ Europe underline the significance of taking national,·,,:~';(;9 Bonoli,Giuliano, Vic George, and Peter Taylor-Gooby. 2000. "Welfare
context into acc~unt. We agree with Hantrais and Letablier's ," t.':· Priorities: The Narrowing of the National Consciousness." Pp. 72-95
(1996: 189) assertion that: . f· inEuropean WelfareFutttres. Maldin,MA:Blackwell.
';;l,;cc Castles, Francis. 1993.Families o/Nations:Patterns o/PublicPolicy in Western
. '., -DeJnocracies. Dartmouth: Aldershot.
Deflem, Mathieu and Fred C. Pampel. 1996."The Myth of Postnational
Identity: Popular Support for European Unification." Social Forces
75(1):119-43.
,·F"; Esping-Andersen, Gesta. 1990. The Three Worlds o/Welfare Capitalism.
.:':, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Industrial
Relations and Social Affairs. 1994."The European Union and the Fam-
ily." SocialEurope no. 1.
Eurostat- 1995. WomenandMen in theEuropean Union:A StatisticalPortrait.
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Com-
munities.
Gauthier,Anne Helene. 1996. Tbe StateandtheFamily:A ComparativeAnaly-
siso/FamilyPolicies inIndustrialized Countries. Oxford: ClarendonPress.
. Gornick, Janet, Marcia Meyers, and Katherin Ross. 1997. "Supporting
the Employment of Mothers: Policy Variation Across Fourteen
Welfare States." JournalofEuropean Social Policy 7(1):45-70.
Hantrais, Linda and Marie-Therese Letablier. 1996. Families and Fam-
ily Policy in Europe. New York: Longman.
Jones, Rachel K. and April Brayfield. 1997. "Life's Greatest Joy?: Euro-
pean Attitudes Toward the Centrality of Children." Social Forces
75(4): 1239-70.
Kamerman, Sheila B. 1991. "Child Care Policies and Programs: An In-
ternational Overview." Journal o/Social Issues 47(2):179-96.
Korpi, Walter. 2000. "Faces of Inequaltiy: Gender, Class and Patterns
of Inequalities in Different Types of Welfare States." Social Politics
7:127-191.
Adler, ~~rin~ A. 1997. "Social Change and Declines in Marriage and
Fertility In Eastern Germany." Journal ofMarriage and the Family
59(1):37-49.
Adl~r, Ma.r~na A. and April Brayfield. 1997. "Women's Work Values
ill Unified Germany: Regional Differences as Remnants of the Past."
Work and Occupations 24(2):245-66.
116
! oward this. objec.:ive, we suggest that public opinion constitutes an
lffi~~rtant. ~lffienslon of the n~ti~nal environments in which family
policies ongmate, and thus, we invite researchers to pay more attention
to t~e cul~ural and. economic emheddedness of public opinion and its
~el~tlons?ip to ~olicy ch~ge. Clearly, a next. step in gleaning deeper
msl~tS ~to attitude regunes would involve the in-depth analysis of
vanous "ldeal-typi~al"countries that represent each cluster. The goal
would be to .examme under what circumstances the dialectical process
between p~licydevelo~mentand public sentiments of policy priorities
leads to major changes ill family formation over time.
Patterns in Family Policy Preferences in theEuropean Union
119
Reif,Karlheinz and Anna Melich. 1993. Euro-Barome!er 39.0: European
Community Policies and Family Life, Marcb-April 1993 [computer
file). Conducted by INRA (Europe), Brussels. Ann Arbor, MI: In-
ter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research
[producer), 1993. Koeln, Germany: Zentr~larc~iv fuer em~irische
Sozialforschung/Ann Arbor, MI: Inier-universiry Consortium for
Political and Social Research [distributors], 1994.
Saunders,George R. 1991. "Cultural Values, Child Care, and Parenting:
The Italian Experience in Anthropological Perspective." Pp.435-
460 in ParentalLeaveand Child Care,edited by Janet Shibley Hyde
and Marilyn J. Essex. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Skocpol, Theda and Edwin Amenta. 1986."Statesand SocialPolicies."An-
nltalReviewofSociology 12:131-57.
Treas,Judith and Eric D. Widmer. 2000. "Married Women's Employment
. Over the Life Course: Attitudes in Cross-national Perspective." Social
Forces 78:1409-1436.
--
r',
,f;
t:
, .{
~
·f
~.• '.
r
Socia/Thought & Research
Korpi, Walter. 1989. "Power, Politics, and State Autonomy in the De-
velopment of Social Citizenship." American Sociological Review
54:309-28.
Lewis, ~a~e".1993. "Introduction: Women, Work, Family and Social
Policies In Europe." Pp. 1-24 in Wornen and SocialPolicies in Eu-
rope: Work, Family and the State, edited by Jane Lewis. Aldershot·
Edward Elgar. .
Lewis,Jane.1992. "Gender andtheDevelopmentofWelfare Regimes."Journal
ofEuropean Social Policy 3:159-73.
Liebert, Ulrike. 2001. "DegenderingCare and EngenderingFreedom." P
26
. p.
1-288 In Women& Welfare: Theory andPractice in theUnitedStates and
Europe, edited by Nancy Hirschmann and Ulrike Liebert. New
Brunswick: Rutgers.
Macura,Miroslav, Mi~chell.Eg?ers, and Tomas Frejka. 1995. "Demographic
ChangeandPublic Policyill Europe." Pp. 8-44inPopulation, Familyand . .:h'
Welfare: A ComparativeSurvey ofEuropean Attitudes, Volume 1,editedby
Hein Moors and RossellaPalomba. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Millar, JaneandA. Warman. 1996.Family Obligations inEurope. London:Fam-
ilyPolicyStudies Centre.
Misra,]oya. 1998. "Mothers or Workers? The Value of Women's Labor:
Women and the Emergence of Family Allowance Policy." Gender&
Society 12(4):376-399.
Moors, Hem cu:d RossellaPalomba.1995. Population, Familyand Welfare:A
Comparatz'veSurveyofEuropeanAttitudes, Volume 1.Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
O'Connor,!ulia.1993. "Gen?er, Classand Citizenship in the Comparative
A~~ysls ofWelfareRegimes: Theoretical and Methodological Issues."
BritishJournal cfSocioiogy 44(3):501-18.
Orloff, Ann Shola',1993. "G~nder and the Social Rights of Citizenhip:
The Comparative Analysis of Gender Relations and Welfare States."
American Sociological Review 58(3):303-328. '
Ostner, Ilona and Jane Lewis. 1995. "Gender and the Evolution of Eu-
ropean SocialPolicies." Pp. 159-94 in European Social Policy: Between
Fragmentation and Integration,edited byStephan Liebfreid and Paul
Pierson. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute.
Papa~opoulos,T~eo~orosN. 19~8. "Greek Family Policy from a Compara-
tlv.e Perspect~ve. Pp.47-57ill Women, Workand theFamilyin Europe,
edited by EIleen Drew, Ruth Emerek and Evelyn Mahon. New
York: Routledge.
118
